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DENIAL OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES UNDER THE
ILLINOIS SURVIVAL ACT-MA TTYASO VSZKY V. WEST
TOWNS BUS COMPANY
Matyas Mattyasovszky, a 12-year-old boy, was run over and killed
while attempting to re-enter a bus owned and operated by the West
Towns Bus Company. Plaintiff, decedent's father as administrator,
brought actions under the Wrongful Death Act' and the Survival Act, 2
charging the defendant bus company with ordinary negligence and wilful and wanton misconduct. The evidence indicated that the bus company was negligent in the establishment and enforcement of adequate
safety procedures. The jury found the decedent free from contributory
negligence, found the defendant guilty of wilful and wanton misconduct,
and awarded plaintiff $75,000 in pecuniary damages and $50,000 in
punitive damages. The Illinois Appellate Court vacated the award of
punitive damages, holding that recovery under the Survival Act is limited to compensatory damages.' The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed
1. Illinois Wrongful Death Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, §1 (1973) states in part:
[W]henever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect or
default, and the act, neglect or default is such as would, if death had not ensued,
have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in
respect thereof, then and in every such case the person who or company or
corporation which would have been liable if death had not ensued, shall be liable
to an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured, and
although the death shall have been caused under such circumstances as amount
in law to felony.
2. Illinois Probate Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, §339 (1973), states in relevant part:
[In addition to the actions which survive by the common law, the following
also survive: actions of replevin, actions to recover damages for an injury to the
person (except slander and libel), actions to recover damages for an injury to
real or personal property or for the detention or conversion of personal property,
actions against officers for misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance of themselves or their deputies, actions for fraud or deceit, and actions provided in
Section 14 of Article VI of "An Act relating to alcholic liquors" . . . .
3. Mattyasovszky v. West Towns Bus Co., 21 Ill.App.3d 46, 313 N.E.2d 496 (2d Dist.
1974), reviewed in 2 S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH 409-10 (2d ed. 1975) and
Kiely, Damages, Equity, and Restitution - Illinois Remedial Options, 24 DEPAUL L. REV.
274 (1975).
The plaintiff originally had recovered on the wrongful death action, at the trial level.
On appeal the defendant contended that a recovery of punitive damages was improper in
a wrongful death action. Plaintiff conceded and amended his complaint to include additional counts; one seeking recovery under the Survival Act and the other seeking recognition of a common law action for wrongful death including exemplary damages. In keeping
with previous Illinois case law, both the appellate and supreme courts denied appellant's
motion for recognition of the common law count for wrongful death and exemplary damages. Baird v. Chicago, B.& Q.R.R. Co., 11 Ill.App.3d 264, 296 N.E.2d 365 (4th Dist. 1973).
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this holding in Mattyasovszky v. West Towns Bus Co.4 This Note will
discuss the significance of the court's interpretation of the Survival Act
as it relates to future litigation under the Act and the problems raised
by the appellate and supreme court decisions.
The right to bring a cause of action after the death of a party has
existed in Illinois since 1829,1 when the Survival Act was first adopted.
Except for a modification in 1872, when the legislature expanded the
scope of the statute to include actions to recover damages for injuries
to the person, except slander and libel,' and later, actions to include
Dram Shop awards,' the statute in effect today is identical to the one
enacted over a century ago.'
In 1882, the Illinois Supreme Court in Holton v. Daly' explained the
important distinctions between the Survival and Wrongful Death Acts
for the first time. The court held that the Wrongful Death Act limits
recovery to pecuniary damages for negligent acts resulting in death and
that such damages are to be awarded for the benefit of the decedent's
survivors. In contrast, the Survival Act permits the decedent's estate to
bring certain types of actions which would otherwise abate at death
under the common law. The court added that the Wrongful Death Act
provides the exclusive remedy for personal injuries which caused the
decedent's death. Thus, the Survival Act was interpreted to permit
The plaintiff urged the court to recognize the latter action, citing Moragne v. States
Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970) and Gaudette v. Webb, 284 N.E.2d 222 (Mass.
1972). The Illinois Supreme Court distinguished Moragne on the facts, since the victim
in that case would have been denied all compensation had equitable discretion not been
exercised, 61 Ill.2d at 34-35, 330 N.E.2d at 511. Gaudette was distinguished as merely
adjusting the statute of limitations of Massachusett's wrongful death statute for similar
equitable considerations. Neither of these considerations were present in Mattyasovszky
since the victim had already received compensatory damages. The appellant's motions
were also denied on policy grounds. See text accompanying note 25 infra.
4. 61 Ill.2d 31, 330 N.E.2d 509 (1975).
5. Law of July 1, 1829, §127 IlI.Laws [1829] 233. As first enacted, the statute allowed
actions of trover, detinue or replevin to survive for and against executors and administrators. For a detailed history of the Illinois Survival Act see Hurley, A Matter of Life and
Death, 60 ILL. B. J. 472 (1972). See Mattyasovszky v. West Towns Bus Co. 21 Ill.App.3d
at 52-53, 313 N.E.2d at 500-01; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3 §339 (Smith-Hurd 1961) (historical
notes); Note, Death of the Abatement Doctrine - Murphy v. Martin Oil Co., 24 DEPAUL

L.

REV.

608 (1975).

6. Law of July 1, 1872, §123 Ill.Laws [1871-72] 108-9; Devine v. Healy, 241 Ill. 34, 89
N.E. 251 (1909), revg, 141 Ill.App.290 (1908); Northern Trust Co. v. Palmer, 171 II. 383,
49 N.E. 553 (1898).
7. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, §339 (1973). This provision was originally enacted in 1934.
8. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3 §339 (Smith-Hurd 1961) (historical notes).
131 (1882).
9. 106 Ill.
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recovery for injuries sustained by the decedent only if those injuries did
not directly cause the death.1"
The latter distinction was abolished in Murphy v. Martin Oil Co." in
which the Illinois Supreme Court expressly overruled Holton, holding
that both the heirs and the estate may sue for injuries directly related
to the decedent's death.'" The heirs, as before, may bring suit under the
Wrongful Death Act and recovery is limited to pecuniary damages. The
estate may also bring an action under the Survival Act to recover damages for injury to the person, pain and suffering, and damage to the
decedent's property. Murphy, however, left unanswered whether punitive damages were also recoverable under the Survival Act. 3 The question was resolved in Mattyasovszky by the court's holding that recovery
under the Survival Act is limited to compensatory damages.' 4
The Mattyasovszky decision results in a significant limitation on the
range of recoverable damages that were potentially available under
10. Id. at 139-41; accord, Susemiehl v. Red River Lumber Co., 376 I1. 138, 33 N.E.2d
211 (1941) (declared any change in interpretation of the two statutes would have to come
via legislative action); Shedd v. Patterson, 312 111.371 (1924); Wilcox v. Int'l Harvester
Co., 278 Ill. 465, 116 N.E. 151 (1917); Ohnesorge v. Chicago City Ry. Co., 259 Ill. 424, 102
N.E. 819 (1913); Northern Trust Co. v. Palmer, 171 Ill. 383, 49 N.E. 553 (1898); Chicago
& E. Ill. R.R. v. O'Connor, 119 Ill. 586, 9 N.E. 263 (1886); Hurley, supra note 5, at 378;
Kiely, supra note 3, at 278; Note, supra note 5, at 612-13. But see Graul v. Adrian, 32
Ill.2d 345, 205 N.E.2d 444 (1965); Saunders v. Schultz, 20 Ill.2d 310, 170 N.E.2d 163
(1960); Chidster v. Cagwin, 76 Ill.App.2d 477, 222 N.E.2d 274 (2d Dist. 1966).
11. 56 Ill.2d 423, 308 N.E.2d 583 (1974).
12. Id. at 432, 308 N.E.2d at 587. See Mattyasovszky v. West Towns Bus Co., 21
Ill.App.3d 52-53, 313 N.E.2d 501 (2d Dist. 1974); SPEISER, supra note 3, at 409, 430; Kiely,
supra note 3, at 278-80; Note, supra note 5. A majority of jurisdictions interpret their
survival statutes to allow recovery for injuries resulting in death. See Greene v. Texeira,
54 Hawaii 231, 505 P.2d 1169 (1973); Rohlfing v. Moses Akiona, Ltd., 45 Hawaii 373, 369
P.2d 96 (1961) rev'd on other grounds; Metrinko v. Witherell, 134 Me. 483, 188 A. 213
(1936); Thorton v. Ins. Co. of No. Am., 287 So.2d 262 (Miss. 1973); Landers v. B.F.
Goodrich Co., 369 S.W.2d 33 (Tex. 1963). For a comprehensive list of all the relevant
statutes in each state see SPEISER, supra note 3, Appendix A, at 643-787.
13. 21 Ill.App.3d at 53, 313 N.E.2d at 501. The majority of jurisdictions do not permit
recovery of punitive damages. See Meehan v. Central R.R.Co. of N.J., 181 F. Supp. 594

(S.D.N.Y. 1960); Atchison, T.&S.F.Ry.Co. v. Townsend, 71 Kan. 524, 81 P. 205 (1905);
Wilson v. Whittaker, 207 Va. 1032, 154 S.E.2d 124 (1967). For a list of all the relevant
statutes in each state

see SPEISER,

supra note 3, Appendix A, at 643-787.

Some jurisdictions follow the general rule that punitive damages are not recoverable
under any statute that does not expressly or by clear implication confer a right to such
damages. Meehan v. Central R.R. Co. of N.J., 181 F.Supp. 594, 598 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
There is no mention of this rule, however, in the supreme court opinion. There is also no
definite indication that the court considered this rule in arriving at its decision in
Mattyasovszky.

14. 61 111. 2d at 34, 330 N.E.2d at 510.
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Murphy. The decision also greatly restricts the liability which may be
imposed upon wilful and wanton tortfeasors who cause the death of their
victims. The impact of these limitations is clearly illustrated in
Mattyasovszky where denial of punitive damages reduced plaintiff's
recovery and defendant's liability by 40%.' 5
In addition, Mattyasovszky holds that wilful and wanton tortfeasors
who cause the death of victims will be exempt from punitive damages,
while those who merely injure their victims will not. This result is somewhat incongruous since Illinois does allow recovery of punitive damages
in tort cases not brought under the Wrongful Death or Survival Acts. A
case in point is Moore v. Jewel Tea Co." involving a personal injury
action for damages caused by the explosion of a can of drain opener
which blinded the plaintiff. The court awarded punitive damages to the
plaintiff based on the defendant's conduct. This dichotomy in judicial
treatment, between those wilful and wanton tortfeasors who cause the
death of their victims and those who do not, has existed in Illinois as a
result of the Holton rule." Following Murphy, the court in
Mattyasovszky had the opportunity to eliminate this dichotomy, but
instead chose to continue the double standard and perpetuate the old
adage that "it is cheaper to kill your victim than to maim him."'"
The lack of logic of this double standard, providing preferential treatment for those who cause the death of their victims, has been sharply
criticized. Justice Goldenhersh, the sole dissenter in Mattyasovszky,
urged that the preference be eliminated adding that precedent should
not stand as an insurmountable obstacle to change.' 9
15. Plaintiff had been awarded a total of $125,000 at the trial court level, but this was
reduced to $75,000 by the appellate court and affirmed by the supreme court.
16. 116 Ill.App.2d 109, 253 N.E.2d 636 (1st Dist. 1969), aff'd, 46 Ill.2d 288, 263 N.E.2d
103 (1970). See Madison v. Wigal, 18 Ill.App.2d, 564, 153 N.E.2d 90 (2d Dist. 1958); Kimes
v. Trapp, 52 Ill.App.2d 442, 202 N.E.2d 42 (3d Dist. 1964); Wetmore v. Ladies of Loretto,
73 Ill.App.2d 33,196 N.E.2d 521 (2d Dist. 1964).
17. Holton v. Daly, 106 Ill. 131 (1882), overruled, Murphy v. Martin Oil Co., 56 Ill.2d
423, 308 N.E.2d 583 (1974).

18. W. PROSSER,

HANDBOOK ON THE

LAW

OF

TORTS

902 (4th ed. 1971).

19. 61 Ill.2d at 38-39, 330 N.E.2d at 513. Goldenhersh quoting from Murphy stated:
"What this court observed in Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No.
302 (1959), 18 Ill.2d 11, 26, may appropriately be said again:
'We have repeatedly held that the doctrine of stare decisis is not an
inflexible rule requiring this court to blindly follow precedents and
adhere to prior decisions, and that when it appears that public policy
and social needs require a departure from prior decisions, it is our duty
as a court of last resort to overrule those decisions and establish a rule
consonant with our present day concepts of right and justice.'"
56 Ill.2d 423, 308 N.E.2d 583 (1974).
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One commentator, Stuart M. Speiser, has also criticized this double
standard, presently applied in other jurisdictions, noting
[I]t makes no sense for a state that allows punitive damages for a
wilful, wanton, malicious, reckless, or grossly negligent tort that results
in personal injury, emotional anguish, or property damages, to deny
such punitive damages where the injury victim happens to die. Death
is, after all, the final injury-the ultimate insult. Such a result defies
logic and distorts symmetry in the law."0
Even the appellate court, which denied the punitive damages, criticized
the dual standard. The court reluctantly based its decision on its interpretation of the mandatory legislative intent of the Survival Act and
expressed regret at the perpetuation of the double standard. The appellate court stated:
In addition to deterring others from wilful and wanton misconduct,
[awarding punitive damages] would bring death actions into complete
harmony with the general body of law governing other types of tortious
conduct. Logically, it would seem that punitive damages should be
allowed to the estate of the decedent under the survival statute.
Despite our highest desires, however, law is not always based upon
logical rationale. 2'
The court also discussed plaintiff's motion for recognition of a common law action for wrongful death to include punitive damages. 2 In its
discussion," the court agreed with the appellate decision that the purpose of punitive dampges is the same as that which motivates the
criminal law-to punish and deter. However, the supreme court stated
that the justification for awarding such damages was significantly diminished in Mattyasovszky. The bus driver, who was primarily responsible for the injury, had been dismissed as a party by the plaintiff before the case went to the jury. Thus, if punitive damages were to be
imposed, they would not deter actual misconduct but rather punish the
bus company for mere vicarious liability. The supreme court also objected to awarding punitive damages because the cause of action was for
wilful and wanton conduct, which it described as "a characterization
that shades imperceptibly into simple negligence." 24 Unlike conduct
20. SPEISER, supra note 3. He recommends a model uniform survival act including a
provision for the survival of such punitive damage claims as may have been awarded had
the victim lived. For a general discussion of punitive damages in survival actions see id.
at 423.
21. 21 Ill.App.3d at 54, 313 N.E.2d at 502.
22. See note 3 supra.
23. 61 111.2d at 35, 330 N.E.2d at 511.
24. Id.
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which merits criminal sanction, this wilful and wanton conduct lacked
specific definition, and the court therefore was unwilling to impose additional liability. Further, referring to civil cases, the court noted that the
amount of the judgment is determined by the jury for the benefit of the
plaintiff whereas in criminal cases the fine is set by statute and the
money is awarded to the state.25 Thus, an award of punitive damages is
a windfall to the plaintiff, being neither for the compensation of the
victim nor for the benefit of the state.
The reasoning used by the supreme court in formulating this policy
is subject to criticism. There is no conclusive indication that the liability
imposed upon the defendant West Towns Bus Company was vicarious.
As the court mentioned, the bus driver was dropped as a party before
the case went to the jury. The jury then found the defendant West
Towns Bus Company guilty of wilful and wanton misconduct. There
were two possible grounds for this verdict. Either the bus company was
vicariously responsible because of the misconduct of its driver or the bus
company was guilty by its own acts or omissions. There was evidence
that the defendant West Towns Bus Company had improperly maintained the vehicle involved in the accident, and had, in addition, failed
to establish and enforce adequate safety procedures.2" Thus, it is conceivable that the jury did not find purely vicarious liability but rather
determined liability based upon the wilful and wanton misconduct of
the bus company itself.
Even if one assumes that the jury did impose liability vicariously, it
is not necessary to conclude that the award of punitive damages was
improper. Both section 217C of the Restatement (Second) of Agency and
section 909 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts discuss punitive damages as follows:
Punitive damages can properly be awarded against a master or other
25. Id. The court's discussion of the desirability of awarding punitive damages under
the facts of Mattyasovszky occurred in its consideration of plaintiffs motion for recognition of a common law action for wrongful death including exemplary damages. See note 3
supra. While the court may have been influenced by these considerations, there is no
conclusive indication that these policy considerations formed the basis of the court's
statutory interpretation as is suggested in another article on this case. See Blanco, Recent
Decisions, 64 ILL. B. J. 196 (1975).
26. Evidence revealed that the defendant's bus lacked an outside, right rear view mir-

ror; that the bus' rear door safety device was inoperable due to the corrosion of the contact
points in the bell housing; and that the driver was not required to check the rear door
safety device prior to each run, although such a check required only a matter of minutes.
Based on this evidence, the appellate court specifically stated that the verdict finding the
defendant guilty of wilful and wanton misconduct was not against the manifest weight of
the evidence. 21 Ill.App.3d at 50, 313 N.E.2d at 499.
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principal because of an act by an agent if, but only if:
(a) the principal authorized the doing and the manner of the act,
or
(b) the agent was unfit and the principal was reckless in employing
him, or
(c) the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was acting in the scope of employment, or
(d) the principal or a managerial agent of the principal ratified or
approved the act. 7
The supreme court cites this section to support its position. One could,
however, also cite this section to permit the imposition of punitive damages in Mattyasovszky. The defendant West Towns Bus Company did
authorize the "doing and manner" of maintaining the bus involved. The
defendant's failure to properly maintain the bus and to establish and
enforce adequate safety procedures establishes that it was not personally innocent. Further, it may be argued that the West Towns Bus
Company was reckless in employing its agent bus driver.28 The Comments to Restatement (Second) of Torts express approval for the use of
punitive damages, as a deterrent to the employment of unfit persons in
important positions provided that such damages are not used to punish
innocent parties. 9
In lieu of further explanation of its position, the court suggested a
comparison between Toole v. Richardson-MerreU, Inc.3° and Roginsky
v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.3" Both cases dealt with injuries resulting
from an improperly prepared drug. In Toole a California court awarded
punitive damages upon a finding that defendant's officers and directors
deliberately falsified reports and suppressed evidence concerning the
possible toxicity of the drug. In Roginsky, a later case involving the same
drug and the same defendant, a federal court interpreted New York law
to deny an award of punitive damages. The court found that under New
York law, a corporation may be held liable for punitive damages only
when superior officers order, participate in, or ratify outrageous conduct." Concerning punitive damages and vicarious liability, it found
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217C (1975); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 909 (Tent. Draft No. 19, 1973).
28. The unfitness of the bus driver was indicated by his conduct. Prior to the accident,
he turned off the stop-signal bell and did not call out the bus stops. After the victim
became entrapped, he drove on despite shouts from passengers inside and pounding of
pedestrians outside the bus.
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §909, comment b (Tent. Draft No. 19, 1973).
30. 251 Cal.App.2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967).
31. 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967).
32. Id. at 842.
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that where punitive damages are sought, evidence of misconduct by
subordinate employees may be so widespread as to support a finding
that management authorized it or pursued a policy of deliberately closing its eyes, but evidence here was not sufficient to warrant such a
33
finding.
The Roginsky court addressed itself to one narrow issue of vicarious
liability, that is, whether widespread evidence of misconduct by subordinate employees results in a corporate ratification of the misconduct.
That is not the issue of vicarious liability presented in Mattyasovszky.
Here, if vicarious liability was indeed imposed, it can be argued that it
was done under agency principles in that the defendant corporation
authorized the "doing and manner" of providing inadequate safety and
3
maintenance procedures and that it recklessly hired an unfit driver. 1
Moreover, the court in Roginsky denied punitive damages primarily
because it judged Richardson-Merrell, Inc., to be merely reckless and
not guilty of wilful and wanton conduct. This was not the case in
Mattyasovszky. Also the court in Roginsky was presented with a "disaster" situation where multiple suits were being brought against the same
defendant. Mattyasovszky involves but one victim and one possible
recovery.
One can easily argue against the court's contention that the standard
of wilful and wanton conduct is insufficiently defined to merit punitive
damages. In fact, wilful and wanton conduct is well established and
widely utilized as a ground for the imposition of punitive damages. 5 As
previously mentioned, Roginsky, cited by the court to support its position, denied punitive damages specifically because it deemed the defen3
dant's conduct not to be wilful and wanton.
The court also stated that the amount of an award of punitive damages is set by a jury rather than regulated by statute as are criminal
fines. It thus implied that there is no protection against the imposition
of exorbitant punitive damages. This is not the case. Punitive damages
must have some reasonable relationship to the motives and acts of the
defendant and ordinarily to the injury inflicted. 37 Moreover, awards of
33. Id. at 843-44. See notes 27-28 and accompanying text supra.
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §217C (1957). See text accompanying note 27
supra.
35. See LaCerra v. Woodrich, 321 Ill.App.107, 52 N.E.2d 461 (1st Dist. 1943); Nosko v.
O'Donnell, 260 III.App. 544 (1st Dist. 1931); Kurrus v. Seibert, 11 II.App. 319 (1882). See
also Pepsi-Cola Distrib. v. Barker, 274 F.2d 372 (4th Cir. 1960); Meadows v. Vaughan, 81
Ga.App. 45, 57 S.E.2d 689 (1950); Sebastian v. Wood, 246 Iowa 94, 66 N.W.2d 841 (1954).
36. 378 F.2d at 843. While there were other grounds for the court's decision, this was
certainly one of the major ones.
37. Aladdin Mfg. Co. v. Mantle Lamp Co., 116 F.2d 708 (1941); Connett v. Winget, 310
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excessive damages are subject to judicial review and reversal." Finally,
the argument that an award of punitive damages will result in a windfall
to the plaintiff does not by itself present a compelling interest sufficient
to supercede the purpose of punitive damages, namely, to punish and
.8
deter wilful and wanton tortfeasors .
Analyzing Mattyasovszky, one notes that in arriving at its decision,
the supreme court reasoned that the Survival Statute has never been
interpreted to authorize punitive damages. It did not cite any precedent
specifically denying such damages, but stated, however, that the
Murphy decision implicitly limited recovery to compensatory damages.
This interpretation is in direct opposition to the interpretation of the
appellate court which had not read Murphy as precluding punitive
damages. 3 Unfortunately, the Illinois Supreme Court in Mattyasovszky
did not comment on the validity of the appellate court's reasoning. This
clouds the implications of Mattyasovszky. Can one assume, for example, that the supreme court has affirmed the reasoning of the appellate
decision? And if so, what does this mean? It was impossible for the
appellate court to interpret the Survival Statute on the basis of the
legislative proceedings, as no substantive records of these hearings are
preserved. In arriving at its decision the appellate court utilized a threepart syllogism based upon prior Illinois case law. The court began with
the language of the Act, "damages for injury to the person," which it
interpreted to mean "damages of a physical character," 0 and reasoned
Ill.App. 533, 34 N.E.2d 878 (2d Dist. 1941); Spelina v. Sporry, 279 Ill.App. 376 (lst Dist.
1935); 15 ILL. L. & PRAC. Damages § 133 (1968).
38. Burton v. Hitachi America Ltd., 504 F.2d 721 (1974); Bums v. West Chem. Prod.,
Inc. 12 III.App.3d 947, 299 N.E.2d 455 (1st Dist. 1973); Wanner v. Kennan, 22 Ill.App.3d
930, 317 N.E.2d 114 (2d Dist. 1973).
38.1. In deciding Mattyasovszky, the supreme court also considered an amicus brief
submitted by thirteen railroad companies. They argued that allowing punitive damages
under the Survival Act would result in the virtual economic ruin of public transportation
systems in Illinois.
This argument, however, is misleading since it is well established in Illinois that awards
of excessive damages are subject to judicial review. See id.
Furthermore, it may be argued that wilful and wanton corporate tortfeasors may decide
that it is more economical to continue to pay mere compensatory damages than to change
established corporate practices. Ironically, the plaintiff in Mattyasovszky noted in his
reply brief that the defendant corporation had not changed its maintenance 6r safety
procedures as of the time of trial. Allowing punitive damages enhances the court's power
to deter wilful and wanton misconduct as it increases the ability of the court to make such
actions prohibitive due to cost.
39. 21 Ill.App.3d at 54, 313 N.E.2d at 502.
40. Id., citing Shedd v. Patterson 230 Ill.App. 553, 557 (1923), aff'd, 312 Il. 371, 144
N.E. 5 (1924).
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that punitive damages are not "damages of a physical character."'"
From that analysis, it concluded that the legislature intended to allow
the recovery of compensatory damages only.
This is the same type of reasoning employed by the court in Holton
v. Daly to interpret the statutory intent of the Wrongful Death Act as
refusing damages for pain and suffering.2 Holton exemplifies the court's
use of case law to arrive at what it then considered to be the mandatory
legislative intent, a rationale which appears to indicate that the court
is doing nothing more than creating a non-existent legislative purpose.
Later cases noted the basic inequity of this decision.43 Finally, the court
in Murphy expressly overruled Holton, basing its decision on the fundamental unfairness of the prior holding and the lack of logic of the Holton
court's interpretation of the Wrongful Death Act.44
Similarly, in this case, while the supreme court did not specifically
adopt the appellate court's interpretation of legislative intent, it may be
contended that it at least acquiesced.45 It may be assumed, therefore,
that the reason the supreme court refused to award punitive damages
was because it interpreted the intent of the legislature to preclude such
an award. 6
The unfairness of the Holton rule lasted for over ninety years. It is
possible, barring legislative action,47 that it may take the court another
41. Eshelman v. Rawalt, 298 Ill. 192, 197, 131 N.E. 675, 677 (1921) (punitive damages
are those assessed in the interest of society to punish the defendant and to warn him and
others that such acts are offenses against society).
42. 106 Ill. 131 (1882).
43. See Saunders v. Schultz, 20 Il.2d 301, 107 N.E.2d 163 (1960); Susemiehl v. Red
River Lumber Co., 376 Ill.
138, 33 N.E.2d 211 (1941).
44. 56 11.2d at 431, 308 N.E.2d at 587.
45. There is a contrary argument that silence is not tantamount to acquiescence. However, the court has consistently looked to legislative intent to interpret the Survival Act.
It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that had the court interpreted the legislative intent
contrary to the appellate court it would have so stated.
46. One commentator has sharply criticized the validity of the reasoning found in the
appellate court opinion.
[Tihe court gave an unduly restrictive interpretation to the relevant position
of the Survival Act, treating it, in effect, as a separate statutory cause of action,
providing for recovery where none was allowed under any circumstances at
common law. The Wrongful Death and Dram Shop Acts are clear examples of
the latter type. The Survival Act, on the contrary, does not create a cause of
action where none existed before, but simply prevents a common law action for
injuries, in its full scope, from abating upon death.
Kiely, supra note 3, at 281.
47. A lack of legislative action will be interpreted by the court as a ratification of their
position. '
It is axiomatic that where a statute has been judicially construed and the con-
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ninety years to recognize the basic unfairness of its decision in
4
Mattyasovszky. 1
Nicola Sabato Tancredi
struction has not evoked an amendment, it will be presumed that the legislature
has acquiesced in the court's exposition of legislative intent.
People v. Hairston, 46 Ill.2d 348, 353, 263 N.E.2d 840, 844-45 (1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S.
972 (1971).
48. Assuming one feels that this decision is a correct interpretation of the Survival Act,
and further that this result is unjust; it does not seem likely that the legislature will
modify the Act. For example, in 1941 the supreme court acknowledged the unfairness of
the Holton decision in Susemiehl v. Red River Lumber Co., 376 Ill. 138, 33 N.E.2d 211
(1941) but held that any change would have to come from the legislature. Nearly twenty
years later in Saunders v. Schultz, 20 Ill.2d 301, 170 N.E.2d 163 (1960) the court again
commented on the unfairness of the Holton doctrine. Noting the absence of any corrective
action on the part of the legislature since Susemiehl, the supreme court took it upon itself
to modify the Holton decision by allowing recovery of medical and funeral expenses.
Finally, the court in Murphy v. Martin Oil Co., 56 Ill.2d 423, 308 N.E.2d 583 (1974)
expressly overruled Holton.

